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Book Review 
EQUAL JUSTICE: THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT,t by 
Arthur J. Goldberg. Evanston, illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
1971. Pp. 117. Reviewed by W. Taylor Reveley, Ill* 
Emblazoned on the portals of the great edifice that houses 
the Supreme Court of the United States are the words "Equal Jus-
tice under Law." 
Equal justice was an unrealized goal when the "marble pal-
ace" was erected in the 1930's; it is still unrealized. 
It is the thesis of this book that great progress was made to-
ward the realization of equal justice during the years in which 
Earl Warren served as Chief Justice of the United States. 1 
In a book of slightly more than one hundred pages, former Jus-
tice Arthur Goldberg presents his apologia for the Warren era, of 
which he was a stalwart during his three years on the Court. His ob-
jectives are threefold: "to explain the advances made, to justify the 
overrulings necessary to these advances, and to demonstrate why the 
Warren Court's decisions should stand."2 The three chapters of this 
book-"A Court of Relevant Justice," "Judicial Activism and Strict 
Constructionism," and "Constitutional Stare Decisis"-are devoted suc-
cessively to these ends. This review, in tum, will move from a precis 
of Mr. Goldberg's principal arguments to comment on certain of them. 
I. PRECIS 
A. A Court of Relevant Justice 
Goldberg observes that we live in a time of rapid social change 
occasioned by revolutionary advances in education, communication, 
and technology. "Litigating organizations" have confronted the 
Court "with cases raising every facet of every important social prob-
lem" and the press of events denies the Justices an opportunity "gin-
gerly to enter upon a problem, then to wait for a generation until 
[their] handiwork had been tested in experience."3 Nonetheless, the 
author insists, the Court must attempt to redress social ills as they are 
t 1971 Rosenthal Lectures, Northwestern University School of Law. 
* Attorney, Hunton, Williams, Gay & Gibson, Richmond, Virginia. 
1. A. GoLDBERG, EQUAL JusTicE: THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME CoURT vii 
( 1971) [hereinafter cited as GOLDBERG]. 
2. /d. at 7. 
3. ld. at 5. 
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laid before it. He places overriding importance on "the need to make 
our declared principles, our constitutional protections, into a workable 
and working reality for those to whom they must often seem to be the 
sheerest of illusion and promissory deception."4 To bridge the gap 
between principle and practice, the Court must consider "the reality 
from which the claims spring and in which the claimants live."5 If 
the Justices shrink from the facts of life, they "increase the distance 
between declared law and reality and . . . heighten the mistrust of the 
legal system already felt by too many who are subject to its do-
main."6 
For Goldberg, relevance was one of the great virtues of the War-
ren court: "[l]t brought to constitutional adjudication a common-
sense willingness to deal with the hard and often unpleasant facts of 
contemporary life."7 Focusing on race, reapportionment, and the 
rights of the accused, Goldberg traces what he believes were the major 
achievements of the Warren era. 
He celebrates Brown v. Board of Education8 and its progeny as 
primal indicia of the Court's willingness to grapple with the world as 
it is-"to measure the actual impact of official conduct," "to look 
through formalistic devices to substance and to strike down or remedy 
evasive doctrines."9 Baker v. Carr10 and its progeny are similarly, if 
somewhat less euphorically, cited for their recognition of voting re-
alities. Primary attention, however, is devoted to criminal justice, be-
cause the decisions in this area are most vulnerable to challenge.11 
Here the Warren court contributed to relevant justice by taking ac-
count of the circumstances in which the poor, ignorant, and otherwise 
remediless defendants operate, and "introduced an entirely new prin-
4. · ld. at 26. 
5. Id. at 31. 
6. ld. at 29-30. 
7. /d. at 31. 
mt appeared that the Warren Court was manifesting a growing and possibly 
more general impatience with legalisms, with dry and sterile dogma, and with 
virtually unfounded assumptions which served to insulate the law and the Con-
stitution it serves from the hard world it is intended to affect. If still not articu-
lated, there was discernible a general groping for what might be called a "new 
realism" in the Court's approach, a retreat from abstraction and an increased 
willingness to attach broader significance to the realized human impa,ct in the 
events that gave rise to legal disputes and court cases. That movement was both 
healthy and necessary; it responded to an increasingly apparent fact of modem 
life--the gap, too often a chasm, between the sometimes pietistic pronouncements 
of our system and its performance in fact. 
Id. at 25-26. 
8. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
9. GOLDBERG 22. 
10. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
11. "The rights of the criminal defendant do not share the majoritarian popular-
ity of the reapportionment cases, the compelling morality of the civil rights cases, or 
the emerging popular appeal of the free speech, press, and privacy cases." GOLDBERG 
8. 
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ciple--a new promise--that where there is a right, that right will not 
remain unenforceable because of the defendant's poverty, ignorance or 
lack of remedy."12 
Goldberg divides the criminal justice decisions into four groups: 
(1) cases eliminating the effects of an accused's poverty;13 (2) deci-
sions giving effect to already established rights, whether to ensure that 
they can be meaningfully exercised14 or that a remedy exists for their 
violation;15 (3) cases defining the bounds of recognized rights;16 
and ( 4) decisions applying federal constitutional safeguards to the 
states. 17 Indicative of the mild paranoia that afflicts defenders of these 
decisions is Goldberg's citation of Warden v. Hayden18 among thecate-
gory-three cases, and his observation that Warden's elimination of the 
"mere evidence" rule "tends to rebut the argument that the Warren 
Court always redefined constitutional rights in order to expand them in 
favor of the accused."19 
B. Judicial Activism and Strict Constructionism 
Having argued that the Warren court took notable strides down 
the road of relevant justice, Goldberg turns to justification of the over-
rulings necessary en route. He first states that the "basic attitude with 
which the Court [approaches] claims that fundamental personal liber-
ties are infringed" is "one of the most important questions to ask about 
any court, past, present, or future."20 In his definition of the appro-
priate attitude lies much of Goldberg's justification of the Warren 
court's reversal of prior dogma. Investigation of attitude involves 
him in consideration of strict construction, judicial restraint, and the 
tempering of judicial "protection of basic personal liberties for fear of 
the reactions of others."21 
Goldberg deals with strict construction principally to dismiss it 
as a useful concept. He contends that the notion does little to separate 
the sheep from the goats, as "nearly every justice considers himself a 
strict constructionist in the sense that he tries to apply the Constitution 
12. I d. at 20. 
13. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (assistance of counsel for 
the indigent); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (free transcript on appeal for 
the indigent). 
14. E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to counsel at the 
accusatory stage). 
15. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment exclusionary 
rule applied to states). 
16. E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest 
only of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"). 
17. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) .. 
18. 387 u.s. 294 (1967). 
19. GOLDBERG 17. 
20. ld. at 35, 36. 
21. ld. at 36. 
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in accordance with the intent of the framers." 22 But that intent, says 
Goldberg, "is not always easy to ascertain; historical materials rarely 
point unambiguously to a single, particular disposition for an individual 
case."23 Further, strict construction cannot be equated with judicial 
quiescence, as some of the Warren court's critics seem to think: 
"[S]trict constructionists, conservative or liberal, have tended to be 
judicial activists. They have exercised their power of judicial review 
to the full. "24 
Though Goldberg does not find strict construction an operation-
ally useful concept, he does accord functional significance to judicial 
restraint-"the basic attitude that makes a court most reluctant to 
overturn legislative judgments. "25 That restraint, he believes, is what 
the critics of the Warren court really have in mind, even when they 
talk of strict construction. But while conceding that judicial restraint 
is a sound philosophy as regards laws regulating economic matters, 
Goldberg argues that it "has only limited applicability when the treat-
ment of minorities, the fundamental liberties of individuals, or the 
health of the legislative process are at issue."26 He notes that this 
differentiation between the protection given economic and civil liber-
ties has led some critics of the Warren court to accuse its members of 
having "simply followed their personal predilections rather than con-
sistently applied principles of law."27 
Goldberg turns for justification to the fourteenth amendment and 
to the philosophical underpinnings of judicial restraint. He finds "every 
evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect the 
slaves newly freed . . . and . . . personal rights in general" but "not 
a scintilla of evidence . . . that the Amendment was intended to 
abridge or curtail the police power of the state in any other way."28 
Further, he finds "four . . . sets of circumstances in which strict ju-
dicial scrutiny of governmental action is ... perfectly consistent with 
that respect for democracy inherent in the notion of judicial restraint."29 
22. ld. at 37. 
23. ld. Goldberg identifies a type of ambiguity that provides unusual interpreta-
tive freedom to those who glimpse it: 
Historical materials are sometimes ambiguous on the question of whether the 
framers intended a particular constitutional provision to be interpreted "static-
ally" or "dynamically." That is to say, the framers may have believed that a given 
factual situation lay outside the scope of protection in 1789 or 1868, and yet 
they may have been fully aware of the likelihood that, as circumstances change, 
the same factual situation will later fall within the scope of protection. They 
may have fully intended for the Constitution to apply in this fashion. 
Jd. at 38. 
24. ld. at 41. 
25. ld. 
26. ld. at 61. 
27. ld. at 43. 
28. ld. at 44. 
29. ld. at 46. 
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These circumstances exist when (1) legislation adversely affects per-
sons unrepresented in the legislature; (2) the integrity of the legisla-
tive process itself is threatened through restrictions on the opportunity 
of those in the minority to persuade others of their views; (3) protec-
tion is needed for "an easily identifiable group, . . . that has difficulty 
.forming political alliances and, as a result, finds itself in the minor-
ity on many, if not most, important legislative issues";30 and (4) pro-
tection is needed for "particularly feared or hated individuals, such as 
political dissenters or criminal suspects."31 Goldberg concludes that 
judicial restraint in these circumstances could undermine the Bill of 
Rights. 
But restraint, in his judgment, is appropriate when judges re-
view legislative regulation of property rights: 
It is merely stating a fact of life to say that economic interests 
have political influence. They are ordinarily capable of organiz-
ing, forming coalitions, and finding access to the legislative pro-
cess. They are, in other words, able to protect their interests in the 
political forum in ways that are often unavailable to those injured 
when personal liberties are infringed. 32 
Accordingly, for Goldberg, the Warren court's overrulings in defense 
of personal liberties are constitutionally and philosophically secure 
against criticism as unwarranted judicial lawmaking. 
Judicial activism, however, risks public opprobrium and legisla-
tive retaliation from those offended by the nature of the Court's hold-
ings. Goldberg's response to such backlash is essentially one of "Damn 
the torpedoes," though he recognizes that occasionally the Court 
may have "to trim its sails. "33 He stresses the strength of the Court 
and the acceptability of its decisions, and argues that when the Court 
has made decisions for political reasons, it more often than not has in-
flicted a "shameful wound upon itself. "34 Goldberg feels that the par-
ticularly trying times in which we live make even more essential judicial 
activism uninfluenced by fear of backlash. 
C. Constitutional Stare Decisis 
In his concluding chapter, Goldberg's primary concern is to de-
fend Warren court decisions against would-be overrulers, though these 
decisions themselves often reversed the work of prior courts. In the 
process, he further elaborates his contentions that Chief Justice War-
ren and his colleagues decided cases by consistent application of le-
30. Id. at 49. 
31. Id. at 50-51. 
32. ld. at 52. 
33. Id. at 54.. 
34. Id. at 54-55, 
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gal principle, not pursuant to personal prediliction, and that their over-
rulings were justified. 
Goldberg gives the Warren court high marks for principled adju-
dication: "I honestly believe that never in the past history of the Court 
have its members been better trained, worked harder, or availed 
themselves of better research facilities. And never has a Court ap-
plied these resources more consistently or diligently in the service of 
principle."35 He implicitly recognizes, however, that to ward off 
would-be overrulers, it is not enough that Warren court activism 
was devoted to good ends in a craftsmanlike and principled manner. 
Thus, he falls back upon stare decisis. But to so defend Warren era 
decisions, many of them striking departures from precedent, presents 
Goldberg with a credibility problem of the first order. 
He acknowledges the duality in his argument that the Warren 
court's civil libertarian decisions were reached "without affront to the 
doctrine of stare decisis and that those decisions cannot now be re-
jected without such affront."36 Goldberg finds justification in his read-
ing of the "uneven" impact of precedent on constitutional adjudication, 
a reading that eases the way for the expansion of civil liberties while 
making more difficult their contraction. He cites 
. . . a general and neutral principle that has long been observed, 
although, as far as I am aware, it has never before been fully ar-
ticulated. The principle . . . is that stare decisis applies with 
an uneven force-that when the Supreme Court seeks to overrule in 
order to cut back the individual's fundamental, constitutional pro-
tections against governmental interference, the commands of stare 
decisis are all but absolute; yet when a court overrules to expand 
personal liberties, the doctrine interposes a markedly less re-
strictive caution. 37 
Accordingly, to the extent that Warren court decisions expanded indi-
vidual rights, they gave no affront to precedent. 
Goldberg devotes the balance of his book to the reasons he finds 
persuasive for an "uneven" reading of constitutional stare decisis. He 
identifies five considerations. The first, the "most pervasive and per-
suasive," is "that the constitutional safeguards of our fundamental per-
sonal liberties were instilled with an innate capacity for growth to en-
able them to meet new evils."38 Second is the mandate of the Bill of 
Rights to guard against the tyranny of the majority, a tyranny that 
may influence justices "not always . . . insensitive to political pres-
sure or contemporary fears." 39 Third are the reliance interests cen-
tral to the concept of stare decisis, especially in criminal justice. 
35. Id. at 72. 
36. ld. at 75. 
37. ld. at 74-75. 
38. Id. at 82. 
39. Id. at 87. 
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Fourth, Goldberg turns to the symbolic significance of the Court's 
decisions. He argues that during our two centuries of judicial expe-
rience, "once fundamental rights have been recognized, there has never 
been a general reversal of direction by the Court, a going back against 
the trend of history."40 Accordingly, the public has come to expect 
continued growth of constitutional liberties. Hence the impact of their 
contraction would "heavily outweigh the corresponding reactions 
to an equal step forward."41 The "multiplier effect" would be in-
creased even further because the Court "plays a most important role 
in expressing the essential morality inherent in the Constitution."42 
Worse, Goldberg argues, contraction would undermine the credibility 
of all that the Court has previously termed, and would have remain, 
"fundamental." 
Fifth, Goldberg deals with "practicalities of power," which, 
though they do not actively favor expansion, do affirmatively militate 
against contraction. He speaks of the Warren court's overriding of 
state sensibilities to protect individuals' rights and observes that, af-
ter the states have been denied certain powers and become accustomed 
to their denial, "common sense reinforces the command of stare de-
cisis not to give back to the states any of their previously asserted 
power to curtail fundamental liberties . . . . Nothing is to be gained 
by overruling those cases which caused wounds to state sensibilities that 
have already healed. "43 Similar practicalities apply, in Goldberg's 
view, when the focus shifts from state to public sensibilities: "Once the 
advance in constitutional rights has been made and the 'newness of 
the standard wears off,' the tough part with respect to public opinion is 
past; and again stare decisis and common sense preclude retreat."44 
In sum, 
The impact of stare decisis on our constitutional safeguards 
.. results in a ratchet-like effect. Under its dictates, the Court 
can readily move to expand those liberties . . . but contraction 
meets stiffer resistance. And . . . this concept of stare decisis 
both justifies the overruling involved in the expansion of human 
liberties during the Warren years and counsels against the fu-
ture overruling of the Warren Court libertarian decisions.45 
Thus, it is on adherence to precedent that Mr. Justice Goldberg ulti-
mately, and somewhat ironically, relies to shelter the constitutional ad-
vances of the Warren era. 
40. ld. at 90. 
41. Id. at 93. 
42. ld. 
43. Id. at 95. 
44. Id. at 96. 
45. Id. 
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II. COMMENT 
The accomplishments of Chief Justice Warren and his colleagues 
merit Mr. Goldberg's enthusiasm. He presents these accomplish-
ments in terms that are well ordered, always clear, and occasionally elo-
quent. The book, however, suffers from a weakness characteristic of 
its genre. It is another in the procession of writings by public figures 
based on lecture notes warm off the lecturn, which tend in a few pages 
to cover a broad range of subjects. Superficiality results, breeding ar-
guments that would be more credible if offered in less simplistic and 
unqualified fashion. The following comments focus on certain as-
pects of Goldberg's apologia that might be enhanced by futher elabo-
ration. 
A. A Court of Relevant Justice 
Goldberg captures an obvious but often unrecognized reality 
regarding the Warren court when he traces the theme of relevant jus-
tice through its work. One of that Court's salient characteristics was 
its unusual willingness to recognize the existence of social ills and at-
tempt to remedy them. Goldberg also appropriately sets as a goal for 
future Courts continued bridging of the gap between principle and 
practice through law shaped to deal with life as it actually is. 
But Goldberg's injunction to the Court to bridge the gap be-
tween principle and practice cannot be taken as an absolute. The quest 
for relevant justice must itself be tempered by the reality that the 
Court has limited authority and resources to remedy social ills. There 
are many hard and often unpleasant facts of contemporary life that 
constitute denials of equal justice, most of which, as Goldberg points 
out, will be laid before the Court by one claimant or another. The 
Court lacks the decisionmaking capacity to deal with all of them. It 
lacks the requisite lawmaking mandate or enforcement power to 
remedy certain social ills. It may conclude that the time is not ripe to 
confront yet others, perhaps because society itself lacks the will or re-
sources to bring practice meaningfully into accord with principle. 
Thus, claimants will present to the Court some gaps between principle 
and practice whose hard and unpleasant facts the Justices may prop-
erly recognize but fail nonetheless to treat. 
In such instances, the Court can simply ignore the claimant by 
declining to hear his case. Or it may take the case and remedy it in 
part, ignoring the balance of the claim. Occasionally a place exists even 
for unsupported judicial assumptions or sterile legalisms to keep alive 
principles pending the time that the Court feels that it or society can 
act to bring practice into line with principle. To cite a criminal jus-
tice example: It seems better for the Court to maintain the fiction that 
most defendants who plea bargain have voluntarily admitted their 
guilt than judicially to admit that most plea bargainers have been co-
416 LAW FORUM [Vol. 1973 
erced into confession by the prospect of more severe penalties were 
they to go to trial and be found guilty. Since our system of criminal 
justice rests inextricably upon guilty pleas from the vast majority of 
those accused, the Court cannot go far toward recognition and elimi-
nation of plea bargaining coercion without wrecking the system. By 
maintaining the fiction that most of those who plea bargain have vol-
untarily admitted their guilt, the Court retains voluntary confession 
as the principle and thus exerts constant, if limited, pressure on the 
system to bring practice into line with principle. 46 
In short, relevance requires the Court to confront both the hard 
facts of claims presented to it and also the hard facts of its limited in-
fluence over many of the wrongs so presented. The harsh realities of 
the latter may properly lead the Justices upon occasion to stay their 
hand. 
B. Judicial Activism and Strict Constructionism 
While there are limits on the Court's ability to realize equal justice 
for all claimants before it, its reach remains broad. Goldberg's defi-
nition of that reach, however, seems to skirt several important broad-
ening considerations. 
He begins his treatment of strict construction by reciting, in ac-
cord with public piety, that "nearly every Justice" hews religiously to 
the intent of the framers. He then extricates himself from the cramped, 
mechanistic constitutional .interpretation inherent in such a claim by 
noting that it is difficult to tell what the framers meant on most is-
sues and that sometimes they may have intended a dynamic interpreta-
tion. Conveniently, Goldberg finds that the fourteenth amendment is 
among the constitutional provisions to be given an evolutionary inter-
pretation--one that "encompasses our greater awareness of equality."47 
Goldberg's analysis seems unduly facile. He states as an eternal 
verity the necessity for adherence to the framers' intent, without con-
sideration that their intent may compel practices that are no longer 
viable. He then seeks to give the Court the interpretative freedom it 
needs by sidestepping compelling intent, on the ground that it is am-
biguous, and thus susceptible to a dynamic reading. 
It would have been more credible had Goldberg stated that adher-
ence to the intent of the framers is an important but not decisive con-
sideration in constitutional interpretation-that strict construction is 
not the alpha and omega of constitutional law, even when the intent 
of the framers is clear but static. The judge-made evolution in the in-
46. The Court could, however, go further than it has gone toward giving effect to 
the principle. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinions in North Carolina 
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 775-89 
(1970); and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790,799-816 (1970). 
47. GOLDBERG 39. 
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terpretation of the Constitution strongly suggests that most justices 
have not, in fact, felt themselves bound to follow lockstep the fram-
ers' intent. Rather they have recognized that if the Constitution is to 
remain functional, its interpretation has to move in pace with the 
changing needs and values of the country. Myres McDougal has 
stated the situation in an apt, though dated, manner: 
[l]t is utterly fantastic to suppose that a document framed 150 
years ago "to start a governmental experiment for an agricultural, 
sectional, seaboard folk of some three millions" could be inter-
preted today . . . in terms of the "true meaning" of its original 
Framers for the purpose of controlling the "government of a na-
tion, a hundred and thirty millions strong, whose population and 
advanced industrial civilization have spread across a continent." 
Each generation of citizens must in a very real sense .interpret the 
words of the Framers to create its own constitution. The more 
conscious the interpreters are that this is what they are doing the 
more likely it is that their interpretations will embody the best 
long-term interests of the nation. In truth, our very survival as a 
nation has been made possible only because the ultimate inter-
preters of the Constitution-presidents and congressional leaders, 
as well as judges-have repeatedly transcended the restrictive in-
terpretations of their predecessors. 48 
This is not to say that the drafters' intent is unimportant. The 
Founding Fathers may have ordained a practice that remains viable. 
If their design is workable, there is no functional reason to abandon 
it; and there is always a long-term national interest in adherence to the 
design of the framers, lest its disregard undermine public confidence in 
the rule of law. The Court, one of whose major objectives is the crea-
tion and maintenance of the rule of law, cannot ignore or seem to ig-
nore the drafters with impunity. Thus, absent necessity to abandon 
old constitutional patterns because of changed national circumstances, 
a contemporary Court does better to follow them. In short, the intent 
of the framers is an important element in constitutional interpretation, 
but one that historically has been ignored when necessary to ensure 
government practice that serves the changing needs and values of 
the country. 
While Goldberg's treatment of judicial activism is more satisfying 
than his discussion of strict construction, it also seems unnecessarily 
circumscribed. There should have been some recognition that a part 
of wisdom about the judical activism of the Supreme Court is that this 
body is unique among American tribunals. It is the cutting edge of the 
third branch of the federal government, on a plane with Congress and 
the President. Thus the Court has a political character and powers 
48. M. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 446-47 (1960) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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lacking in other American courts. Further, the work of the Supreme 
Court centers on constitutional interpretation, the facet of govern-
ment in which the judiciary as opposed to the legislature or the execu-
tive is preeminent and in which the Court, unlike any other American 
tribunal, has ultimate authority. Other courts are far more concerned 
with judicial development of the common law and with statutory 
interpretation, areas of governance in which the views of the legis-
lature and the executive are of controlling importance. 
Accordingly, when talking of judicial activism, it is important 
to distinguish between the Supreme Court and all other American tri-
bunals. Much that is said about the impropriety of judicial activism 
applies with far more vigor to the latter than to the former. The Su-
preme Court, by virtue of its parity with Congress and the President 
and by virtue of its final authority in constitutional interpretation, 
has a far greater mandate to define society's objectives and govern-
mental patterns than do other courts. Thus to justify activism by the 
Supreme Court, one need not justify activism by judges in general 
An activist Court confronts the dilemma of where to cut short its 
activism. Goldberg to the contrary, this line-drawing problem is not 
one readily susceptible to Wechslerian precision, 49 because it depends 
in good part on the Court's assessment of the gravity of the social ills 
before it and on its assessment of its own capacity to deal with them. 
Thus the Warren court broke through several self-imposed judicial re-
straints of earlier eras to remedy certain cancerous injustices that seemed 
beyond the ministrations of other branches of government. But, as 
indicated, neither that Court nor any other can remedy all of the injus-
tices that claimants put before it. Where to draw the line is a mixed 
question of politics and law that the Court in its discretion must an-
swer. 
As Goldberg points out at some length, the Warren court gener-
ally chose to distinguish between economic and civil liberties cases in 
setting the limits of its activism. The Court's reluctance to apply sub-
stantive due process and equal protection to economic questions is 
explicable in light of the harsh political reaction to their application to 
New Deal legislation by an earlier Court. The Warren era's reluc-
tance in this regard may also reflect the judgment of its Justices that 
they could be effectively activist in only so many areas at once. 
Realistically, however, certain economic cases in which the War-
ren court stayed its hand may well have involved injustice no less in-
tense than much of the wrong that the Court boldly sought to remedy 
in the civil liberties area.50 Many economic claimants do not have 
49. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAR.v. L. 
REV. 1 (1959). 
50. E.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v .. Lee Optical Co., 
348 U.S. 483 (1955); cf. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). The Warren 
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the power to redress their grievances politically. And it is probable 
that most people regard protection of their basic economic interests as 
more important than protection of many of the civil liberties so dili-
gently guarded by the Warren court. For the average man, the oppor-
tunity to earn a living in his chosen manner without unreasonable in-
terference is very likely more precious than access to an unrestricted 
range of media. Thus the Warren court's decision to stay its hand in 
economic cases may have been less an application of neutral princi-
ples of law, as Goldberg suggests, and more a discretionary decision 
in favor of restraint, pending a more propitious time for action. 
It follows that Goldberg's injunction to future Courts to strike boldly 
forward in decisionmaking without fear of political consequences 
is more attractive as inspiration than as a realistic guideline. The 
Court is far more a political institution than any other American tri-
bunal, and its activist decisions often go beyond mechanistic applica-
tion of preexisting law to given facts. The Supreme Court does make 
constitutional law. Its rulings can lead, or fall behind, the exist-
ing values of the country to only a limited extent without harm-
fully disrupting the body politic. Thus the Court, like every other 
governmental institution, must operate within the constraints of its 
times, and not pursuant to a quixotic insistence on vindicating its view 
of the law irrespective of the political consequences. As Goldberg ta-
citly recognizes by his reference to judicial sail trimming in 193 7, 
there are occasions when the Court properly takes politics into ac-
count. 
C. Constitutional Stare Decisis 
The most significant part of Goldberg's analysis is his theory of 
constitutional stare decisis. The argument for an uneven adherence 
to precedent provides persuasive support for those who favor overrul-
ing to expand civil liberties while opposing overruling to contract 
them. Goldberg's work in this regard effectively precludes a simple-
minded application to Warren court overrulings of the maxim that 
those who live by the sword properly die by it: Supporters of the Warren 
era are not estopped from arguing stare decisis to oppose overrulings 
of that Court's decisions simply because those decisions themselves 
often reversed precedent. A distinction does exist in our constitu-
tional tradition between ignoring precedent to expand personal free-
dom and ignoring precedent to contract it. 
It is well to note, however, that Goldberg paints an unduly grim 
picture of the effects of contraction so far as Warren court decisions 
court, admittedly, had ample contemporary precedent for its frigid approach to econo-
mic claimants. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Board 
of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). 
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are concerned. The criminal justice decisions risk the most signifi-
cant erosion. Popular understanding of, and support for, this aspect of 
the Warren court's work has always been minimal, however. And it 
need hardly be said that the accused or convicted do not form an ef-
fective pressure group, whose "cries of repression . . . [in response to 
overrulings] may induce in others the belief that the Court is sanction-
ing repression-inviting it and condoning it."51 Nor, for these rea-
sons, is it probable that for any contraction by overruling in the sphere 
of criminal justice "the Court must pay a huge premium in lost force of 
those decisions that it wishes to retain as 'good constitutional law.' "52 
Although Equal Justice: The Warren Era of the Supreme Court 
occasionally partakes more of the rhetoric of the public speaker than 
the analysis of the scholar, the book merits attention. It provides an 
explanation and defense of the Warren court by a man who was 
among its members for a time and thus has historical value for its in-
sight into Mr. Justice Goldberg's jurisprudence. Further, the book use-
fully captures that Court's unusual willingnt?ss to confront reality in 
its decisionmaking. Finally, Mr. Goldberg offers a theory of stare de-
cisis to resolve the dilemma of those who wish to overrule precedent to 
advance civil liberties without, at the same time, undermining the pro-
tection that stare decisis gives those advances. 
51. GoLDBERG 93. 
52. ld. at 94. 
